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 Could Al Qaeda’s Own Strategy to Defeat Itself Actually Work? 
Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 3 (August 2009) 
by Carl J. Ciovacco 
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
Abu Yahya al Libi’s importance within Al Qaeda and influence on its strategic decisions cannot be 
overstated. However, in his video titled "Dots of the Letters" released on September 9, 2007, Abu 
Yahya sabotaged the terrorist organization from within by providing the United States with six of 
the most potentially effective policy solutions to combat Al Qaeda to date. While not out of 
swagger or self-defeating tendencies, Abu Yahya offered these policy recommendations to 
illustrate just how far off the United States has been in its quest to defeat Al Qaeda. 
This article will analyze the efficacy, feasibility, and current level of utilization of Abu Yahya’s 
recommendations within the U.S. strategy against Al Qaeda. Through Abu Yahya’s advice to 
America, Al Qaeda may have unwittingly triggered its own self-destruct button. 
Could Al Qaeda’s Own Strategy to Defeat Itself Actually Work? 
Since his 2005 escape from Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, Abu Yahya al Libi’s stock within Al 
Qaeda has continued to rise. As a member of the infamous "Bagram Four" which escaped U.S. 
custody, Abu Yahya publically defied and embarrassed the United States and gave hope to his 
fellow jihadists.[1] Overnight he became the jihadist movement’s Robin Hood. He is young, 
energetic, intelligent, charismatic, well-spoken, and considered by many to be the future of Al 
Qaeda.[2] Further strengthening his resume within the jihadist movement, he, unlike Osama bin 
Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, is trained in religion. Abu Yahya is not only a senior member of Al 
Qaeda and member of its Shari’a Committee, but he has also been dubbed Al Qaeda’s Defense 
Minister, Theological Enforcer, and the High-Command’s attack dog.[3] In addition, his numerous 
appearances on as-Sahab, Al Qaeda’s media entity, ranks second only to Zawahiri.[4] 
Abu Yahya’s importance within Al Qaeda and influence on its strategic decisions cannot be 
overstated. Why then would he personally wheel a Trojan Horse into Al Qaeda Central’s 
compound in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan? This Trojan Horse arrived eight 
months ago in the form of a 93 minute video where Abu Yahya laid out how the United States 
could defeat Al Qaeda. In his video titled "Dots of the Letters," the Libyan provided six steps for 
the United States to win the war of ideas. 
Jarret Brachman at the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, has offered his insights as to 
why Abu Yahya has provided the United States with Al Qaeda’s weaknesses. He argues that it 
was neither out of "goodwill nor self-destructive tendencies."[5] Brachman explains Abu Yahya’s 
actions as an "explosive cocktail of youth, rage, arrogance and intellect," with the purpose of first, 
exposing how far behind the United States is in competing with Al Qaeda in the war of ideas and 
second, dispelling fears from within Al Qaeda that the United States will win the war anytime 
soon.[6] As one of Al Qaeda’s chief strategists, however, Abu Yahya may now be regretting 
letting this as-Sahab video get away. 
Regardless of Abu Yahya’s reasoning for providing the United States with Al Qaeda’s 
weaknesses, or whether or not bin Laden sanctioned their release, the United States has been 
afforded an incredible opportunity to act on valuable recommendations. Abu Yahya’s six steps 
are revolutionary not only because it may be the first time in history that a warring party has 
knowingly given its enemy the key to the kingdom, but also because of their incredible insight and 
potential efficacy. Through Abu Yahya’s advice to the United States, Al Qaeda may have 
unwittingly triggered its own self-destruct button. For these reasons, a more in-depth evaluation of 
this unsolicited advice from a high-level insider is warranted to see how the United States could 
operationalize this counter strategy to Al Qaeda’s war of ideas. 
Abu Yayha’s six steps for defeating Al Qaeda are:[7] 
1. Focus on amplifying cases of ex-jihadists who have renounced armed action 
2. Fabricate stories about Jihadist mistakes and exaggerate mistakes when possible 
3. Prompt mainstream Muslim clerics to issue fatwas that incriminate the Jihadist 
movement and its actions 
4. Strengthen and back Islamic movements far removed from Jihad, particularly those 
with a democratic approach 
5. Aggressively neutralize or discredit the guiding thinkers of the Jihadist movement 
6. Spin minor disagreements among leaders of Jihadist organizations as being major 
doctrinal or methodological disputes 
Collectively, this list is impressive because it hurts Al Qaeda on so many levels. It undercuts Al 
Qaeda by detracting from its base of support within the mainstream Muslim community. It 
exacerbates fractures within Al Qaeda and the jihadist movement, provides religious fatwas that 
counter its ideology, and undermines its legitimacy in relation to competing movements within 
Islam. 
A recent speech by Juan Zarate, the U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating 
Terrorism, spoke of the current "markers of success" against Al Qaeda in the War on Terror.[8] 
Several of his markers lined up with Abu Yahya’s recommendations for defeating Al Qaeda. 
Zarate addressed how terrorists were being neutralized with consistency and frequency. He also 
pointed out that rejection of Al Qaeda has "started to emerge within extremist circles"—a point 
which Abu Yahya said was necessary for America to defeat Al Qaeda.[9] While Zarate addressed 
some of Abu Yahya’s points, a more comprehensive view of Abu Yahya’s own markers of 
success would have formed not only a better scorecard by which to evaluate American progress 
against Al Qaeda, but also a better playbook by which to prosecute the war of ideas. 
The balance of this paper will explore Abu Yahya’s recommendations to defeat Al Qaeda. Their 
efficacy, feasibility, and current level of utilization within the U.S. strategy in the war of ideas will 
be analyzed. A closer look at each of the six steps will provide a walk-through for how the United 
States could implement these steps using both past examples and future actions. 
1. Ex-jihadists 
Telling the story of ex-jihadists to the world is one of the most powerful tools to defeat Al Qaeda. 
Al Qaeda prides itself on being on the right side of history in the clash of civilizations. It has 
argued that short-term jihadist defeats at the hands of the West are inconsequential in the long 
war between Islam and the West. Al Qaeda has extended the time horizon of the war as to 
minimize the impact of any one tactical-level loss. Even a draw, such as the Battle of Tora Bora, 
can be seen as a victory because the West was not victorious. However, the defecting en masse, 
or even in part, of jihadists could be the strongest antidote to counter this message that Al Qaeda 
is winning the long war. Not only does it signal a shift in support for Al Qaeda, but it denotes 
future problems in recruitment and flaws in sustainment of the campaign for the Islamic Caliphate. 
Jihadist recruitment and radicalization are analogous to wildfire in the most dry and combustible 
areas. When the number of recruits to jihadist groups rises, its impact is exponential on the 
jihadist cause. Every additional recruit serves as an ambassador for the greater movement, 
inspiring family members, friends, and acquaintances by both the good news in their religious 
solidarity and victories, but also with their bad news of injury and death. Often the latter inspires a 
sense of revenge with willing observers accepting the gauntlet. 
Consequently, the most influential way to counter this spread of jihadist recruitment and 
radicalization is to inspire change from within. Internal change is even stronger than destroying 
jihadist fighters because it avoids their becoming martyrs and living on in memory to fight another 
day. This internal change can be manifested in ex-jihadists. Ex-jihadists have abandoned the 
cause for many reasons. Some leave because of disdain for the violations of noncombatant 
immunity and the targeting of civilians. Others disagree with the designation of the United States 
as the primary target instead of their more proximate source of anger—their own apostate Muslim 
regimes. Still others are disillusioned with the difficult and primitive lifestyles of a jihadist in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, or Iraq, where constant fear of Coalition soldiers follows them everyday. 
Regardless of why ex-jihadists have defected, the critical step is the publication of their story. 
These individual stories, although anecdotal, will help to illuminate the cracks in the jihadist 
movement for all would-be recruits to see. 
Noman Benotman, the former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, is one such ex-jihadist 
with significant power to reform the jihadist movement and undercut Al Qaeda. Benotman fought 
with bin Laden in Afghanistan in the early 1990s against the communist government. He achieved 
a level of importance within the jihadist movement as to receive an invitation by bin Laden to a 
conference of jihadist leaders in 2000.[10] Disillusioned by bin Laden’s future plans to attack the 
United States, Benotman made waves at the conference by voicing his dissent in attacking the 
powerful, "far enemy." In the years that followed, he was further upset by Al Qaeda’s targeting of 
noncombatants.[11] He formally criticized Al Qaeda in 2007 with a public letter to Zawahiri. While 
this recantation by Benotman was a significant event in the Arab media, it was not well circulated 
in the Western media.[12] It should have been. At a time when experts believe the future of Al 
Qaeda lies in Europe, this recantation by a prominent ex-jihadist must be aired on the likes of 
BBC, German RTL, and Italy’s Rai Uno. 
The story of Benotman is not a lone iceberg waiting to sink Al Qaeda. Abdullah Anas is another 
influential ex-jihadist recanter that had worked closely with bin Laden for ten years in Afghanistan. 
Further solidifying his stature within the jihadist movement, Anas married the daughter of one of 
the founding fathers of Al Qaeda, Abdullah Azzam.[13] After disavowing Al Qaeda, the former 
mujahidin has publically worked to stem Islamic extremism. He has even spoken out against 
extremism in sermons at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London—a traditional hot-bed for radical 
Islamic thought.[14] Greater dissemination of this story, and the stories of like-minded individuals 
with similar backgrounds, would pay huge dividends in undermining Al Qaeda’s recruitment 
potential. 
While the United States cannot force the hand of media to publish these stories, it can spread this 
message using venues such as speeches and conferences by State Department and 
counterterrorism officials. 
2. Jihadist mistakes 
Abu Yahya’s second recommendation is to promote Jihadist mistakes. There are two basic 
components to this idea: 1) the exposure of true stories where Al Qaeda has shot itself in the foot, 
and 2) a disinformation campaign centered on introducing negative stories about Al Qaeda that 
may not be entirely true. In the first case, the United States has not done an adequate enough job 
exposing these propaganda gifts from Al Qaeda. Regarding a disinformation campaign, the 
United States should look into mirroring some of the CIA’s successes during the Cold War. 
While Al Qaeda has marketed itself as an Islamic movement, most of its violence has been 
against Muslim civilians.[15] First, it is easier to attack civilians than it is an up-armored and 
prepared American military convoy. Second, the jihadist attackers are not always trained to the 
level necessary to execute precision attacks that limit harm to noncombatants. Increased media 
exposure of attacks on noncombatants, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, will increase animosity 
towards Al Qaeda. The United States and Europe must highlight Al Qaeda’s atrocities against 
civilians for all to see. 
With the proof in the polling numbers, Al Qaeda’s miscalculation in targeting noncombatants has 
begun to detract from its support base. It has overstepped its bounds.[16] Its increased suicide 
attacks within Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Pakistan have caused its supporters to leave in droves. In a 
Terror Free Tomorrow survey from 2005, the year suicide bombings first peaked in Pakistan, the 
number of Pakistanis believing that suicide bombing was justified dropped from 73 percent to 46 
percent.[17] A more recent Terror Free Tomorrow poll in Pakistan shows that support for bin 
Laden has plummeted from 46 percent to 24 percent, and backing for Al Qaeda has dropped 
from 33 percent to 18 percent in the past six months.[18] 
This falling support for Al Qaeda due to its mistake-ridden strategy of targeting noncombatants 
can be accentuated by highlighting the personal stories of its victims. Putting a face to a news 
story adds the human dimension to Al Qaeda’s terror attacks. For example, the global networks 
of Al Qaeda’s victims provide this face to the tragedies of Al Qaeda’s movement and can aid its 
downfall through exposure to the world.[19] 
Al Qaeda’s mistakes are not limited to killing civilians. Another kind of mistake that hurt Al 
Qaeda’s cause was its employment of two mentally handicapped women as suicide bombers in 
Iraq. This February 1, 2008, bombing killed 73 Iraqis, and was responded to almost immediately 
with condemnation by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In an uncharacteristically timely and 
well-engineered media release, she capitalized on this propaganda gift by saying that the attack 
proves that Al Qaeda is the "the most brutal and bankrupt of movements."[20] In addition, the 
spokesman for the Multinational Division-Baghdad said: "by targeting innocent Iraqis, they [Al 
Qaeda] show their true demonic character"[21] Further news coverage suggested conflicting 
reports that the handicapped women were remote detonated and that they were not aware of 
what they were doing.[22] This remote detonation twist to the story brings us to the nexus of 
where the true and accurate reporting of Al Qaeda mistakes could intersect with possible 
fabrication and exaggeration. 
Whether true information or not, a disinformation campaign can wield powerful results. Case in 
point is the use of disinformation in the Cold War by the CIA. In The Mighty Wurlitzer, the CIA’s 
many front organizations were exposed along with how the United States undermined the USSR 
and communism. These front organizations received a paycheck from the CIA but were under no 
explicit obligation to follow CIA orders. The now defunct Encounter Magazine is one such 
example of how a liberal voice impacted the Cold War’s war of ideas. While such organizations 
would need insularity from overt connections to the U.S. government, their benefits in criticizing 
jihadist extremism could be helpful in the current war of ideas against Islamic militants. 
A second example of an effective disinformation campaign is Al Qaeda’s own use of 
disinformation against the United States. Al Qaeda has used carefully orchestrated strategic 
misrepresentation campaigns running the gamut from slight exaggerations to flat out lies. An 
example of how successful this disinformation program has been is the fact that large majorities 
in Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and Indonesia still believe that the 9/11 attacks were not carried out 
by groups of Arabs.[23] 
These strategic misrepresentations by Al Qaeda have all had one goal in common: to incite fury 
in the Muslim community. Once the anger stemming from the disinformation has bubbled over, 
the question of content accuracy is almost a moot point. An example of this misrepresentation is 
Zawahiri’s statement about the United States telling Saudi Arabia to stop printing the Koran. In 
May 2003, Zawahiri said the following: 
Part of the Congressional report on the 11 September events, which the U.S. 
Government banned its publication, included a recommendation to ban the Saudi 
Government from printing and distributing the holy Koran. Why? Because it includes 
verses that call for hating the Jews and Christians. Crime and arrogance have reached 
this point. This is why, beloved brothers, Muslims must consult each other, take care of 
their own affairs, examine their situation, and then strengthen themselves and rely on 
Almighty God in resisting this Crusader-Jewish campaign, which is aimed at destroying 
Islam and Muslims.[24] 
Zawahiri then accused President George W. Bush of being addicted to alcohol. Since the use of 
alcohol is prohibited in Islam, addiction to it is even more abhorrent to Muslims. While Bush 
received a DUI at age 30, this misdemeanor is not commensurate to addiction. Zawahiri also 
attempts to cast all Americans as alcoholics; also inaccurate as only about 5 percent of 
Americans abuse alcohol.[25] Nonetheless, in this well engineered disinformation campaign, 
Zawahiri states: 
Bush suffers from an addictive personality and was an alcoholic. I don't know his present 
condition (Americans know best about that as they are experts in alcohol and addiction to 
it). But the one who examines his personality finds that he is addicted to two other faults, 
lying and gambling.[26] 
From this disinformation campaign, potential Al Qaeda recruits need look no further than these 
lies that all Americans are alcoholics and want to stop printing the Koran in Islam’s most holy 
place. A disinformation campaign when cleverly executed, such as by Al Qaeda today and the 
CIA during the Cold War, can reap invaluable benefits. 
3. Fatwas that incriminate the Jihadist movement 
Abu Yayha’s third of idea of pressuring Muslim clerics to issue fatwas contrary to the Jihadist 
movement would have incredible power in cutting off the cancer of Islamic extremism at the 
root.[27] Peter Bergen has compared this type of intervention on the part of clerics to religious 
chemotherapy that eradicates extremism. Implementing Abu Yahya’s recommendation would 
have two distinct parts. First, it would be the identification of moderate clerics to encourage them 
to issue fatwas against the more extreme clerics and militants. Second, it would target extremist 
clerics and pressure them to recant and recall their previous incendiary remarks. 
When dealing with Muslim clerics, it is important to differentiate between the non-violent and 
violent salafi scholars. The salafi movement is used to describe "proper religious adherence and 
moral legitimacy" to Islam.[28] The schism within this movement revolves around the use of 
violence and, hence, Islamic scholars are separated into those supporting violence and those 
who oppose it. Interestingly enough, since the non-violent salafi scholars comprise the vast 
majority of the movement, their message should be louder.[29] Al Qaeda and the few violent 
salafi scholars, however, have hijacked the entire salafi movement and made it appear that 
violence is the true Islamic interpretation. This could be countered by more moderate clerics 
issuing contradictory fatwas. 
Recently there has been some success by Middle Eastern governments to force the hand of 
extremist clerics to recant for their past remarks and even speak out against Al Qaeda. They 
have even used moderate and reformed clerics to retrain jihadists in prison with a more moderate 
interpretation of the Koran. The opponents of these "reprogramming campaigns" have attributed 
the recent trend of clerics and ex-jihadists recanting as a byproduct of torture in the prisons of 
secular governments. Abu Yahya, in a Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde moment, also expressed his anger for 
this governmental and clerical pressure that follows his advice of disparaging the jihadist 
movement. Abu Yahya said in his "Dots on the Letters" video: 
Tell me, what do you expect from someone who sees the sword above him, the rug in 
front of him and the sheik dictating to him the proof and evidence for the obligation of 
obeying the ruler?[30] 
The names on the list of rehabilitated clerics, however, demonstrate that even extremely credible 
religious figures, especially those not prone to being turn-coats, have already spoken out against 
Al Qaeda. 
The first is the Saudi religious scholar Sheik al Oudah. Lending to his credibility within the jihadist 
movement, he was the founder of the Islamic awakening movement in the 1980s known as 
Sahwa. While not regarded as an American sympathizer, he began criticizing bin Laden in 
September 2007.[31] His personal criticism of bin Laden stated that Al Qaeda’s leader had 
"hijacked Islam," and that while Oudah believed he was unable to influence bin Laden himself, he 
wanted to tell bin Laden’s followers about the problems of Al Qaeda.[32] The transformational 
impact of Oudah on future jihadist recruitment and retention within Al Qaeda has been enormous 
and his further exposure can only hurt the jihadist movement. 
Sayyid Imam al Sharif, aka Dr. Fadl, is another significant cleric who has turned his back on Al 
Qaeda. As the ideological godfather of Al Qaeda and Zawahiri’s mentor, Dr. Fadl published the 
Bible of modern jihad called, The Basic Principles in Making Preparation for Jihad.[33] He also 
provided the religious basis for the idea that Muslims martyring themselves in an act of jihad go 
straight to paradise. Then in November, 2007, Fadl momentously withdrew his support for Al 
Qaeda in the blistering book entitled Rationalization of Jihad.[34] Fadl later called bin Laden and 
Zawahiri "extremely immoral" and cautioned Muslim youth against being "seduced by them."[35] 
While Zawahiri countered that Fadl’s message is skewed because he wrote it from an Egyptian 
prison cell, the damage was already done to Al Qaeda and the greater jihadist movement. 
The significance of Fadl’s reversal cannot be overstated. Whether he was a product of the new 
reprogramming initiatives or not, these rehabilitation programs in the Middle East and Asia have 
thus far had an excellent track-record and should be continued in the future for both radical 
clerics and captured militants. Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan currently run very effective programs 
in which those rehabilitated persons must sign forms agreeing to avoid jihadist activity. In honor-
based societies, those family members and local clerics that pick up their ex-jihadist from prison 
agree to ensure there is no relapse.[36] In Saudi Arabia, this type of program is called de-
radicalization and in Afghanistan it is amnesty.[37] Semantics aside, Yemen, Indonesia, Egypt, 
and Singapore have also followed suit with similarly effective retraining systems.[38] The power 
of moderate clerics working in prisons and using their religious backgrounds to debunk violent 
interpretations of the Koran has paid huge dividends and dissuading jihadists from returning to 
action. 
4. Strengthen other Islamic movements 
Abu Yahya’s point that the United States should strengthen and support Islamic movements 
dissimilar to Al Qaeda is also insightful. This idea is premised on the fact that there are many 
competing movements within Islam and that the competition for recruits is often fierce. In the 
recruiting pool for young, impressionable, and deeply religious Muslims, there are often multiple 
suitors. For example, in Gaza, Hamas and Al Qaeda-like start-ups such as Fatah al Islam have 
often stepped on each others’ toes.[39] When faced with the decision of which organization is 
better to support, the United States should actively favor the group that is less radical and most 
embraces Western ideas such as democracy. The possibility of an Al Qaeda affiliate winning out 
should be proactively prevented. 
One approach the United States could adopt in deciding which competing Islamic groups to fund 
would be to see which groups Al Qaeda leaders are selecting to chastise and why. For example, 
Zawahiri has attacked both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood because they have embraced 
democracy. The incompatibility of democracy and the Sharia Law is one of Al Qaeda’s bones of 
contention. The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest Islamic organization, has not taken Al Qaeda’s 
criticism sitting down. It has begun to mobilize its resources against Al Qaeda, and its Supreme 
Guide of the Brotherhood, Mohammed Akef, has said, "we have made a huge effort in combating 
[the radicals] through spreading a moderate understanding of the Koran."[40] As such, the more 
competitors to Al Qaeda that emerge or become stronger, the more Al Qaeda’s recruiting pool will 
narrow. The United States should look into initiatives that support Al Qaeda’s competitors such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as long as they continue to embrace Islamic moderacy, non-
violence, and democracy. 
5. Neutralize important figures of Al Qaeda 
Abu Yahya’s suggestion to aggressively neutralize the guiding thinkers of the Jihadist movement 
is something that the United States has done fairly well. Abu Yahya said that by decapitating the 
senior members and guiding thinkers of Al Qaeda, remaining members of the movement will be 
left, "without an authority in which they can put their full confidence and which directs and guides 
them, allays their misconceptions, and regulates their march with knowledge, understanding, and 
wisdom."[41] 
Since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the bureaucracy of Al Qaeda has been decimated. In one 
fell swoop, Al Qaeda lost its sanctuary, lines of communication, funding and access to bank 
accounts, training bases, and most of its men. Marc Sageman has placed the remnants of Al 
Qaeda Central—the original members from the Afghan resistance of the 1980s—at only a few 
dozen men. He has also said that the second wave of Al Qaeda that joined in the 1990s has been 
whittled down to only about a hundred fighters.[42] With the large majority of the remaining high-
value Al Qaeda members holed in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, the next step 
would be a coordinated and genuine effort between the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and the United States to root out the hold-overs. 
Once these "guiding thinkers" of Al Qaeda are obtained, however, a nuanced approach to dealing 
with their capture must be adopted. The captured jihadists, regardless of the level of importance 
within Al Qaeda, must be processed, interrogated, and imprisoned without the fanfare associated 
with recent captures or killings of other key figures.[43] If bin Laden is brought to justice and 
paraded around, he will have a "platform for global propaganda."[44] Not parading a high-level 
detainee, however, is counterintuitive to the political desires of displaying the fruits of its labor and 
providing a short-term psychological victory against Al Qaeda. Nonetheless, the value of a 
martyred bin Laden or Zawahiri can be greater in captivity or death than on the battlefield. To 
prevent Al Qaeda figures from becoming martyrs of mythical proportions, they must be "stripped 
on their glory" and treated as common criminals.[45] They cannot be afforded the extra publicity 
that has been so vital in building up Al Qaeda’s reputation. Even applying the title of terrorist 
instead of criminal provides bin Laden and his associates with "a status and dignity that they seek 
and that they do not deserve."[46] As Margaret Thatcher famously stated in 1985, "publicity is the 
oxygen of terrorism." A relatively quiet capture of bin Laden and other high-level Al Qaeda figures 
would steal this oxygen necessary for their legends to thrive. 
6. Exploit internal disputes 
It appears that Al Qaeda has been given a free-pass by the United States when it comes to its 
doctrinal or methodological disputes. Abu Yahya highlighted this American gift in his 
recommendation that America should attempt to spin minor disagreements between the leaders 
of jihadist organizations. Abu Yahya recommended a concerted "war of defamation" against Al 
Qaeda that provides, "a safe-haven for rumormongers, deserters, and demoralizers, [where] the 
door is left wide open for defamation, casting doubts, and making accusations and slanders."[47] 
He argued that if Americans exploited these divisions, jihadist propagandists would be left as 
"hoarse as someone shouting in the middle of thousands of people."[48] A closer look at past Al 
Qaeda disputes would show that the United States has given a bye to Al Qaeda by not playing up 
both its internal rifts and those between itself and other jihadist groups. 
There are three major fault lines within Al Qaeda that, if exploited properly, could create 
considerable damage to the organization. These rifts involve the treatment of Shias, the issue of 
noncombatant immunity, and the targeting of the United States instead of apostate Muslim 
regimes in the Middle East. To date, there has been considerable controversy within Al Qaeda on 
these issues. 
Regarding the question of Shias, Al Qaeda appears to be playing the good cop, bad cop routine. 
While the good cops (bin Laden and Zawahiri) try to secure Muslim unity in the fight against the 
West, the bad cops (Abu Yahya and the former Al Qaeda leader in Iraq Zarqawi) have called for 
the demise of the Shia. Whether bin Laden has consciously allowed Abu Yahya to rail on the Shia 
is difficult to know; however, Al Qaeda currently benefits from having its top leaders call for 
Muslim unity against the West and its second-tier senior leaders consolidate Sunni support by 
calling for attacks on Shia. Al Qaeda appears to be getting the best of both worlds by playing this 
dichotomy out in the global media. With the United States failing to expose this strategy, it has 
allowed Al Qaeda to carry-on unchecked with its bifurcated message. 
An even closer look at bin Laden’s priority of goals demonstrates that bin Laden and Abu Yahya’s 
stance on the Shia question is incompatable. Bin Laden’s current desire for Muslim unity and Abu 
Yahya’s anti-Shia rhetoric point to what Michael Scheuer, the former CIA bin Laden unit chief, 
has called the "most lethal strategic danger to Al Qaeda … the premature, worldwide intra-
civilizational conflict between Sunni Muslims and Shiites."[49] Thus, by certain senior members of 
Al Qaeda calling for the destruction of Shia, they are in direct contradiction to bin Laden’s 
sequential priorities of 1) driving Americans out of Muslim world, 2) destroying apostate Muslim 
regimes and Israel, and 3) once the first two are complete, dealing with the Shia.[50] The United 
States should emphasize these strategic differences pertaining to sequential priorities. 
The second rift is the issue of noncombatant immunity. As previously discussed, the targeted 
killing of both Muslim and non-Muslim civilians has caused a rift in Al Qaeda which has forced 
many Al Qaeda members onto its enemy’s bench. As the carnage of the attacks and the human 
element of the victims are increasingly exposed, this rift could widen. With polling numbers 
indicating plummeting support within the Muslim world for the targeting of noncombatants, the 
die-hard followers of this tactic could find themselves isolated enough to break away from Al 
Qaeda. If this occurred, the fracturing of the movement would be a tactical-level victory for the 
United States. 
The third dispute within Al Qaeda was the decision to attack the United States instead of focusing 
on the secular Muslim regimes of the Middle East. Those that opposed attacking the United 
States believed that the near enemies in the Middle East were still the primary target, and that 
attacking the far enemy (the United States) would only bring disaster upon the future of the 
movement. Exposing this disharmony and all future strategic disagreements would be helpful in 
creating pressures of debate within Al Qaeda. 
In addition to internal Al Qaeda disputes, the disagreements between Al Qaeda and other militant 
Islamic groups could help undermine the greater jihadist movement. In addition to the previously 
mentioned rift between Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda and Hamas have also 
quarreled extensively. This is a telling example because both groups are Sunni and recruit from 
similar pools of individuals. With comparable views toward Israel, Shia, and the West, an 
amenable relationship would be expected. However, in the past year, Al Qaeda has condemned 
Hamas numerous times. It has criticized Hamas because it yielded to international law, "forfeited" 
too much of Palestine, trampled Sharia Law, and adopted democracy. Zawahiri said: 
The Hamas Movement's leadership has transgressed on the rights of the Muslim nation 
and agreed to what it called respecting the international agreements, thus ridiculing 
Muslims' minds and sentiments. I am sorry to face the Muslim nation with the truth, and to 
tell it please accept our condolences for [the loss] of the Hamas leadership … Now, at the 
time of the deal, the Hamas leadership is handing over to the Jews most of Palestine … 
Hamas leadership has abandoned the rule of Shar'iah.[51] 
He further chastised Hamas’ loss of its fighter spirit: 
We cannot relinquish the mujahidin in Hamas and in the rest of Palestine in these 
circumstances, because the defeat of the mujahidin in Hamas and in other mujahidin 
groups is a defeat of jihad in Palestine.[52] 
With Al Qaeda’s public ridicule of a would-be ally in the jihadist movement, exposing these 
macro-level disagreements via the global media would increase in-fighting, unpack suppressed 
dissention, and fracture the movement. 
Another issue that has the potential to ostracize Al Qaeda from the greater Muslim community is 
Al Qaeda’s adoption of takfir. Takfir is the ability to decide who is a Muslim and who is a kuffar, or 
nonbeliever.[53] With Al Qaeda’s self-proclaimed takfir authority, many Muslims are disenchanted 
with Al Qaeda. For example, while Turkish people consider themselves Muslims, bin Laden calls 
the Turkish government apostate and labels its people the worst form of Muslim because they 
have a secular government, embrace democracy, and are allied to the West. Muslims, such as 
those in Turkey, are approaching the tipping point where they will not accept Al Qaeda calling 
them kuffars and will rebel en masse against Al Qaeda.[54] 
Adding to the impending takfir confrontation, Al Qaeda is also on shaky ground regarding the use 
of women in some of its suicide bombings. In addition, Al Qaeda has not addressed the role of 
women in its Internet chat-rooms and their on-line interaction with men.[55] Al Qaeda has also 
run into contradictions with its selective embrace of modernization regarding the media and 
Internet. The media-savvy, publicity-mongering Al Qaeda and its relatively high tech media 
campaign runs juxtaposed to the Taliban’s abhorrence for modernity and technology. Hence, the 
exploitation of this disharmony could drive a wedge between Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups. 
Final Thoughts 
The extent of Abu Yahya’s recommendations for unraveling Al Qaeda is massive because they 
are an internal survey of Al Qaeda’s own weaknesses. It would be on par with Erwin Rommel 
providing the United States with Germany’s gravest vulnerabilities in 1944. Furthermore, the 
advice contains culturally-sensitive insights difficult for American counterterrorism strategists to 
have imagined. For example, the power of a few violent salafi clerics within Al Qaeda and the 
greater jihadist movement was unknown until recently. Research has shown that only a handful of 
radical clerics around the world radicalize a large majority of jihadists.[56] Abu Yahya’s 
suggestion to focus on clerics and fatwas corroborates the importance of fatwas in the war of 
ideas. By informing the United States that it should prompt clerics to issue incriminatory fatwas 
against Al Qaeda, reprogram jihadists, discredit guiding thinkers, and publicize cases of ex-
jihadists, Abu Yahya seems to have exposed Al Qaeda’s jugular to a culturally and religiously 
blind attacker. 
Abu Yahya has given the United States the keys to the kingdom and, in doing so, has provided a 
great opportunity to turn the tide against Al Qaeda in the war of ideas. As argued in this paper, 
the six recommendations are employable and can serve as the blueprint for future initiatives in 
the psychological war. Successfully implementing Abu Yahya’s advice would severely cripple, if 
not destroy, Al Qaeda. Augmenting the American counterterrorism and State Department 
infrastructure to better suit the implementation of this advice will be challenging; however, it is 
feasible with the shifting of resources within the fight. In a war where brute military force has 
proved to be insufficient to defeat the enemy, a pivotal turn in the war of ideas is greatly needed 
to win this long war. Abu Yahya’s insightful, lucid pointers have provided a foundation for the way 
forward. 
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